Using a sample of fare quotes for non-stop travel from New York to London, this paper investigates the dynamics of offered fares as the departure date nears. We find that the general trend is toward fare increase at an accelerated rate as the departure date approaches. Clear differences in price-setting strategies among the carriers competing on a particular route are documented.
Introduction
While a substantial amount of research has been devoted to analyzing the airline industry, relatively few facts are known about airline fares at the micro level. Morrison and Winston (1990) find that fares on any given market depend on the degree of competition and deregulation. It is also suggested that there is substantial dispersion of fares in the industry, the degree of which positively depends on competition (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Stavins, 2001) . The literature examining airport dominance initially suggested (Borenstein, 1989; Evans and Kessides, 1993; Berry, Carnal and Spiller, 1996) that within the US market airlines charge higher fares for trips to/from the airports where they have a dominant position. More recent evidence (Lee and Luengo-Prado, 2005) suggests that this apparent 'hub premium' can be explained by the passenger mix on these routes.
It is common knowledge that the closer the departure date, the higher the fares become.
Travel agents usually advise the public to take trips in the middle of the week because then prices seem to be lower. Yet, the dynamics of changes in fares as the departure date nears has not been studied. Nor is it clear how much less one can expect to pay if one chooses to travel during the middle of the week as opposed to embarking on a trip towards the end of the week. Also, the above facts mostly tell us about the inter-market comparison of prices and/or average fares. The airport dominance literature suggests that there may be intramarket differences in the ways airlines set their fares. Indeed, Bilotkach (2006) detected that last-minute offered fares on the London-New York market were more dispersed across the airlines as compared to the advance-purchase ones. This paper, taking advantage of modern technology allowing easy collection of offered fares on the internet, both studies the dynamics of offered fares in the airline industry, as well as tests for potential differences in observed prices across airlines on a given route. We thus contribute to filling two important gaps in the literature on airline pricing.
We use the sample of offered fares (a total of over 70,000 fare quotes) on the London-New York route, collected in the autumn of 2005. We have a number of competitors on this market, which allows us to observe not only the general trend in fares as one moves closer to the departure date but also whether the dynamics of fare-setting is similar or different across the airlines. We find the following (in addition to the wellknown fact that tickets for travel mid-week are cheaper and that the price increases as the departure date nears). First, the rate of increase in offered fares accelerates as the departure date nears. Second, there are substantial observable across-airline differences in the dynamics of price changes.
Our paper provides the first evidence of differences across the airlines' pricesetting strategies in a given market. The question of the reasons behind those dissimilarities is left open. Yet, it may be important to take the possibility of carriers employing different strategies into account in the future modeling efforts and data analysis exercises related to the airline industry.
The rest of the paper is organized in a straightforward way. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 discusses results of the data analysis, and section 4 concludes.
Data
To address the question of whether or not individual airlines' price-setting strategies are One surprising result of our data collection exercise is the discrepancy between the airlines' market shares and the shares of quotes in our sample, as evident from Table   2 . This happens due to absence of fare quotes for a number of airlines (most notably British Airways and American Airlines) for dates closer to the departure. The most likely explanation of this fact is that some airlines fill up their economy class cabin more quickly than the others, either due to the differences in price-setting policies, or because their economy class cabins occupy a smaller share of the aircraft. Moreover, airlines' overbooking strategies can be different: while some carriers may stop posting price offers once a cabin is full, others may continue offering high fares, resulting in overbooked flights. Also, the market shares may not be perfectly correlated with the number of fare quotes observed since different airlines may offer different frequency of service, while carrying the same number of passengers, by using aircraft of different size. If we compare our average offered fare to the same as collected by Bilotkach (2006) for the same market, our data will imply a round-trip fare which is about $150
lower. Yet, Bilotkach's data contain a larger share of last-minute fares as compared to our sample.
Let us look at the snapshot of the raw data. 
Results
We subjected our data to relatively simple regression analysis. The quoted fare will be the independent variable in all regressions. The following dependent variables are used.
First, we include the interval (in days) between the date of obtaining the fare quote and the flight departure date, as well as that interval squared. Second, we use airline dummies, and interaction of those with interval and interval squared (Air India is the baseline category here). Third, dummies for the day of the week on which flight is scheduled are included (Monday is the baseline). Finally, other controls are the indicator variable for morning departures, purchase weekday 2 , and the number of fare quotes collected at the same query as the present fare quote (which can be construed as a measure of competition). We also suspected seasonal differences due to major holidays falling within the range of our data collection; yet, including indicator variables for Table 4 reports results of F-tests for equality of coefficients on airline dummies, as well as those on airline dummy-interval and airline dummy-interval squared interactions; the third specification reported in Table 3 is used as the unrestricted model for the relevant tests. Note: F-test is used for relevant comparisons. The unrestricted model is specification (3) from Table 3 . The reported numbers are p-values. Table 3 shows the existence of both the general trend in the dynamics of offered fares, and the airline-specific effects. If one looks at the coefficients at the interval and interval-squared variables, it is easy to see that the general trend implied by our sample is for offered fares to hit the minimum approximately 66 days before the flight 3 and increasing afterwards at an increasing rate. Offered fares for travel on Monday and quoted fare (which is tantamount to the "more competition means lower price" conclusion). Table 4 shows that there are both similarities and differences in observed dynamics of the setting of one-way offered fares across the airlines. Virgin Atlantic is the only carrier whose coefficients are different from those of the other airlines at least at 5% significance level (regression results suggest that VS coefficients are significantly different from AI's, too). On the other hand, United Airlines' dynamics of price setting appears very similar to that observed for American Airlines, Kuwait Airways, and (to a lesser degree) Continental Airlines. British Airways' and Continental Airlines' observed strategies, however similar they make look at the first glance (see Figure 1) , appear totally different once examined more carefully.
Thus, in addition to confirming some of the well-known facts about the dynamics of the price-setting in the industry (i.e. fares are higher closer to the departure date), we can more closely trace the trend of increases in the offered fares (we determined that the general trend is for fares to increase at an increasing rate, as the departure date nears).
Also, we have observed rather significant differences in both levels and the dynamics of price-setting across the airlines operating within the same market. Further, there is no apparent link between the carrier's market share and its price-setting strategy. The three major players on the market, American, British, and Virgin Atlantic, appear to employ different strategies; yet, some of the price-setting dynamics we observed for the major players look similar to that of the 'fringe' firms (e.g. American Airlines and Kuwait Airways).
Concluding Comments
This paper provides new evidence on price-setting strategies employed by the airline companies. By examining a large sample of fares offered by the airlines operating in the London-New York market, we are able to observe that the apparent general trend is for offered fares (after hitting the minimum about two months before the scheduled departure date) to increase at an accelerated rate. Also, there are differences in observed dynamics of price-setting across the airlines. Furthermore, we are unable to deduce any correlation between the observed across-carrier similarities and differences and the airlines' market shares. It is interesting to note that Bilotkach (2006) , while studying dispersion of the offered fares on the same market, determined that the offered fares for last-minute travel were higher for the airlines with lower market share.
The conclusion that airlines appear to employ different price-setting strategies is very interesting since it sheds light on the interaction between the carriers on a day-to-day basis. If we try linking our results to the theoretical models of strategic interaction between the airline companies, we can say that the carriers' best-response functions appear to be different. Answering the question of which model of strategic interaction our results are consistent with is beyond the scope of this paper; yet, the existence of strategic differences across the airlines studied is an important consideration for future research endeavours.
The easiest ways to criticize our analysis would be by pointing out that we only examine one market and that only one-way offered fares are included. Here we should say that, first of all, the market we selected both has many competitors and the price dynamics we observe here is very unlikely to be influenced by actions of one-stop competitors, due to sheer lack thereof. Second, an exercise in gathering fares for return trips would be a much more tedious endeavour, due to the huge number of such fares offered for any given departure date, depending primarily on the duration of the trip. We would need to necessarily select a sub-set of the return trips, and such a selection would necessarily be arbitrary. It is also possible that the airlines could employ more similar strategies in setting the fares for the return trips than those we observed in our sample of offered one-way fares. We leave this question to future research.
